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All Forum Posts by: Carlos Ptriawan

Carlos Ptriawan has started 84 posts and replied 7083 times.

Quote from @Brian Burke:
Quote from @Steven Gesis:

Important takeaway is due diligence review, not only deal level but sponsor track record - yes, past performance is not indicative of future results, but at least it's a metric to review. 


Agreed--but wait, there's more! One of the ways these operators got to the high IRR was to leverage the equity with a lot of debt and senior equity. So in addition to what Steven said about track record and due diligence, investors should pay close attention to how the capital is structured.

High LTVs, short maturities, mezzanine debt, outside preferred equity, and multiple share classes (the recently popular A/B equity structure) all increase risk.  This wasn't taken seriously by many sponsors (who used these methods to attract capital as well as reduce the amount of capital they needed to raise) as well as investors (many of whom didn't understand the risks nor were they educated on these risks by the sponsor outside of a paragraph buried in a 100 page PPM).


To put it simply: basically it's giving all the risk to LP and if profitable, all profit goes to GP.

These are some informations I could gather during GP foreclosure or capital calls.
-------------
During a general partner (GP) foreclosure on a multifamily property, how lender protect its capital:

Non-recourse loans with bad boy carve-outs: Many bridge lenders provide non-recourse loans, meaning the borrower is not personally liable. However, they include "bad boy" carve-outs that trigger full recourse if the borrower commits certain bad acts like fraud or voluntary bankruptcy filing.

Abandonment may constitute default: If the GP abandons or surrenders control of the property during foreclosure, it could be considered an unpermitted transfer that violates the loan agreement and triggers the guarantor's full recourse liability for the unpaid loan balance. This incentivizes the GP to stay engaged.

Lenders can pursue guarantor for losses: Even with non-recourse loans, bridge lenders often require the GP to sign a limited guarantee to be liable for lender losses from things like misuse of rents or failure to maintain the property. This provides some protection if the GP neglects responsibilities during foreclosure.

Ability to expedite taking control: Bridge lenders may push for a deed-in-lieu to more quickly take control of a defaulted property versus a lengthier foreclosure process. However, deeds-in-lieu have some risks that the borrower could later challenge the transfer.

Flexibility to work out solutions: Major bridge lenders emphasize their flexibility and creativity to structure deals around a borrower's unique needs. This suggests more willingness than banks to negotiate mutually agreeable resolutions on a troubled asset.

>>>>>>>>>>>>

>>>>>>>>>

Multifamily bridge loans:

Loan Size:

$1 million and up

Loan Term:

Short-term, typically ranging from 6 months to 3 years

Most common range is 12-24 months

Extension options may be available

Interest Rates:

Higher than permanent financing, often in the teens

Rates vary based on creditworthiness and collateral

Generally 7-10.5% for multifamily, 15-24% for other commercial properties

Amortization:

Typically interest-only payments

Maximum Loan-to-Value (LTV):

Up to 75% of total project cost

Capped at 70% of the completed or stabilized property value

Fees:

Origination fees, legal fees, closing costs typically 1.5-3% of loan amount

Fees can include appraisal, administration, escrow, title policy, and notary charges

Other key characteristics of multifamily bridge loans:

Fast closing process, with funds available quickly

Eligibility based more on property value than borrower credit

Often used for acquisitions, renovations, lease-up, or repositioning

Provided by private lenders, venture capital firms, and commercial real estate lenders

Need to be refinanced or paid off quickly via sale or permanent financing

>>>

here is how extension options can impact the overall cost of a multifamily bridge loan:

Extension fees: Exercising an extension option on a multifamily bridge loan typically requires paying an extension fee to the lender. This fee is commonly 0.25% or more of the loan amount. So extending the loan adds an extra cost.

New rate caps may be required: Lenders often require the borrower to purchase new interest rate caps in order to exercise an extension option. Rate caps act as interest rate hedges to limit the borrower's exposure to rising rates on floating-rate bridge debt.

Rate cap costs have increased: The cost of interest rate caps is tied to benchmark rates like SOFR. As SOFR has risen from 0.5% in March 2022 to over 5% more recently, the cost of rate caps has gone up drastically. Having to buy new, more expensive rate caps to extend the loan increases costs for the borrower.

Extensions used when rates are high: Borrowers commonly use extension options when interest rates remain high at the original bridge loan maturity date. The "extend and pretend" strategy hopes rates will be lower when the extension period ends. But there is no guarantee rates will fall, so the borrower risks paying high rates for even longer by extending.

Opportunity cost of capital: Even if the interest rate does not change when the loan is extended, there is an opportunity cost to having capital tied up in the bridge loan for a longer period instead of refinancing to a permanent loan with a lower rate. The higher bridge loan payments over the extended term increase the total cost.

>>>>>>>.

here are the key factors that determine the number of extension options lenders offer for multifamily bridge loans:

Lender's risk appetite and flexibility: The number of extension options is largely at the discretion of each individual lender. Some lenders are more flexible and willing to offer multiple extension options, while others may have stricter terms.

Borrower's creditworthiness and track record: Lenders are more likely to grant extension options to experienced borrowers with strong credit and a proven history of successful multifamily investments. Riskier borrowers may receive fewer or no extension options.

Property performance and stabilization timeline: If the lender believes the property will take longer to stabilize and meet the criteria for permanent financing, they may offer more extension options upfront. Conversely, if the property is expected to stabilize quickly, fewer extensions may be granted.

Market conditions and interest rate expectations: In volatile market conditions or when interest rates are expected to change significantly, lenders may offer more extension options to give borrowers flexibility to time their exit.

Negotiation between borrower and lender: The specific number of extension options is often negotiated on a case-by-case basis between the borrower and lender. Borrowers with strong negotiating power may be able to secure more extension options.

In summary, the number of extension options for a multifamily bridge loan is determined by a combination of the lender's policies, the borrower's qualifications, property-specific factors, market conditions, and individual negotiation. Typical bridge loans offer anywhere from zero to two 12-month extension options, but this can vary widely depending on the specific lender and deal characteristics.

Post: Bay Area House Hackers, what's your story

Carlos Ptriawan#1 Market Trends & Data ContributorPosted
  • Posts 7,162
  • Votes 4,415

cheapest 4/5 BR in bay area is now 700-750k , not that bad...

Quote from @Varun Hegde:

He went on a podcast less than a month ago, so Lane Kawaoka is definitely still marketing himself as an expert.

I actually remember reading about him a couple months ago and feeling jealous, but the only way I could've built similar scale is running 90% LTV on multiple deals... sounds like that's what they did.

It doesn't surprise me that many of these syndications are blowing up left and right. Rates are a challenge, sure, but so many GPs also bake in easy operating environment and assume no cap rate expansion.

@Giles D. maybe if you offer to interview him for a podcast he'll show up? I'm thinking something like Maury or Jerry Springer


well .... promising 15% IRR at cap rate 3.8%. All of these non-sense mathmatically speaking lol. Super higher leverage that the purchase can't be approved by agency loan.

In all practicallity , the era of 2016-2020 by aggregate should only produce 7-8% IRR if one correctly and conservatively.

They targeted the naives investor in biggerpocket that lacks basic real estate valuation.

The real problem is really the era of 2015-2020 where folks are treating CRE just like OTCBB pink stock and promoting it as a safe haven.

Quote from @Brian Burke:
Quote from @Russell Brazil:

Instead he put said money (other peoples money at that) into higher risk assets/markets which would then be more prone to a price correction. And in doing so, completely wipe out their equity position and lead to foreclosure. 

I don't think it's that, Russell. The asset that is the subject of this thread is in Houston, and not the worst area of Houston, either. It's a 70s vintage deal, 400+ units, with a lot of nearby competition, so certainly there is some risk elevation from the asset/market, but that's the least of the problem here, in my opinion.

If the numbers on CoStar are correct, the property was purchased at the very top of the market for $47M, with a $39.4M bridge loan (that would likely mature this year).  And according to an article published by the Texas Real Estate Research Center, there was a $5.25M preferred equity tranche as well.  Add the pref to the debt and you have 95% combined senior capital in front of the investor's common equity. 

This allows the sponsor to buy a nearly $50M property with just a few million of investor equity--but it provides zero resiliency to an adverse market.  A 5% movement down wipes out 100% of the equity, and multifamily values are down 5% or more almost everywhere since late 2021.

I'm less inclined to say that they invested in a higher risk asset/market, and more inclined to say that they invested at an inopportune time with a high-risk capital structure.  This structure, if the data I'm finding is true, is unsurvivable if the market moves against them.

 What is so fascinating for me at the beginning is why on earth any lender would lend their money to them.

Every debt agency and lender itself doesn't believe the project would succeed.

It's a strange world where the thing that I and you know should not happen in the first place and indeed it happened in the real world. I think Fed rate zero per cent really makes a lot of people hallucinate.

Some of the bridge-loan is even allowing dscr 0.2, it is very similar to subprime lending, except it happened to syndication involving supposedly informed investors.

The debt agency even said that most of these projects have 0.3 NCF variance. 

Post: Arrived homes investing

Carlos Ptriawan#1 Market Trends & Data ContributorPosted
  • Posts 7,162
  • Votes 4,415
Quote from @Rafal Soltysek:

Does anyone invest with Arrived homes?- and what is your overall take and experience with it?-) 

Raf, Las Vegas 


 i will give them the most honest provider award. Not best just honest.

it seems there are less than 30% of funds-level that has healthy DSCR-fund-level operating at above 1.4. Seems bridge-lender has MF CLO running at 90-110% LTV.

Even the GP that was touted to be good a few years ago by even the most senior folks are having trouble.

this month it seems the industrial is starting to get hit.

however as everybody knows it doesn't mean the multifamily is bad , it just means the next gp could make money after buying from a discounted deal and it seems the bottom is near.

what's certain we need to calculate who would receive those discount from the lender side, lets say assuming 10 year is settled at 4% until 2035. This industry started to make sense again after 2025.

This tweet From X is very funny :

So, basically, we buy 9caps in the Midwest. And after unforeseen capex, we usually net $437 a year. Then, we sell for a 9cap in five years.”

- Rick and Ricky, SFR gurus



“We bought this house in Toledo for $31,500 and sold it 10 years later for $34,000”

:-) sorry my Toledo friend :)

I found a lot of Lane's teaching dangerous (but so does other BP teaching), but I would not say it openly before as he's very friendly, like when he said commercial real estate is way safer than the stock market index. While he trades CRE is almost like a day trader, he keeps buying and selling property very fast for an asset that's not in his expertise/level. He's multi-leveraging everything. I wish he stayed in a rental only. I just know he is going to collapse someday. The Fed is helping him eventually.

Post: What can make a bedroom legal?

Carlos Ptriawan#1 Market Trends & Data ContributorPosted
  • Posts 7,162
  • Votes 4,415

with help of AI:

for a room to be legally considered a bedroom in California according to building codes, it must meet the following key requirements:

  1. Entrance: The bedroom needs at least two methods of egress - it should be accessible from inside the house (commonly through a door), and have one other exit like a window or door.
  2. Ceiling Height: At least 50% of the bedroom ceiling must be a minimum of 7 feet in height. The total ceiling height cannot be less than 7 feet 6 inches.
  3. Escape: The bedroom must have at least one other exit besides the main entrance, either a door to the exterior or an openable window. The window must have a net clear openable area of 5.7 square feet (5.0 square feet if ground floor), a minimum openable height of 24 inches, a minimum openable width of 20 inches, and the bottom of the opening must be within 44 inches of the floor.
  4. Size: The room must be at least 70 square feet, and no less than 7 feet in any horizontal dimension.
  5. Lighting & Ventilation: A natural light source (window) of not less than 8% of the floor area and natural ventilation (openable window/door) of at least 4% of the floor area are required.
  6. Heating: The bedroom must have heating capable of maintaining a minimum room temperature of 68°F.
  7. Smoke Detector: A smoke detector is required in each sleeping room.

While a closet is expected in most bedrooms, the International Residential Code does not actually require a bedroom to have a closet. However, some local jurisdictions may mandate it.Additionally, bedrooms must meet certain electrical outlet and lighting requirements, cannot have openings directly into a garage, and with some exceptions cannot contain gas appliances. Overall, while state building codes provide baseline requirements, the exact legal definition of a bedroom can vary by city and county across California.