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All Forum Posts by: Bradley Laddusaw

Bradley Laddusaw has started 1 posts and replied 38 times.

Good Morning @Dane Fitch,

Thanks for the reading my article and providing some context. Loaded question and this reply got longer than expected. Again, these are just my assumptions and opinions as I have no direct information or connection to these Institutional Capital Providers, "Big Money". To put the performance of these bonds into context, I feel performance is less FICO driven vs. a combination of skin in the game and experience as you alluded to. Over the past couple of years I witnessed loan quotes requiring at least 5 flips, LTV at 75%/100%, 2% and 9.99%-10.99% interest transition into no experience needed or 1 flip, LTV at 90%/100%, 1% and rates starting in the 8%'s. How was this possible? Getting comfortable saying we are holding funds back in reserves and basing the loan off of 65%-70% ARV.

In speaking to people in the industry, what are the couple terms they throw around interchangeably.  It is ARV and LTV.  You have an As-Is (which I think is LTV) and then you have the ARV. Unfortunately a lot of professionals in the space use just LTV when discussing both.  I am concerned loans started to be packaged up at 65% LTV, when that very easily should have been ARV.  Again, my own concerns not supported by direct knowledge.  Just going off a hunch on how loans are quoted on a daily basis.

Here is where I question the performance on these higher leverage point loans.  Who budgets their rehab perfectly?  No one.  How many reserves may be underfunded in a time when qualified GC's are charging premiums?  Most of them.  I know that from speaking to various fund control companies here is CA.  If a borrower has only 10% skin in the game, what are the chances of him putting another 10-20% in to potentially lose that same 10%-20%?

Over the life of a rehab loan, the property value does not go straight up.  Rather it is a J-Curve type return.  Reason being, once wind is blowing through the property, the property is not worth what the borrower paid for it, most likely less.  Then as renovations start being completed, value goes up.  What I hope does not occur, are a large number of defaults at the bottom of the J.  With that being said, the market could trade flat for the next 12 months, America gets back to work sooner than later and we do not see a material pull back in values which will help support the performance.

Performance of the lower LTV bridge on income properties I think will perform better.  Main reason being, the skin in the game component of those loan structures but I could be wrong.

Timing on the return of Big Money.  I believe there are still a couple players in the industry still performing but again, they were not the ones writing the crazy loans.  I think it will return, but not in the mass waives that it was and LTV/Pricing will revert back to market.  I think the Correspondent Programs will be limited and vetted more stringently.  The times of the 90%/100% loan structures I feel are over.  Now to the when?  I do not think the Big Money returns until they are able to perform a full breakdown of their portfolios to see what their overall exposure is.  They will also not be returning until the dust settles on government restrictions pertaining to payments/foreclosures as well as when there is an exact timeline on when America will be back open for business.  The hurdle for them is not necessarily having the money available, but not having the back end buyers that are willing to buy these securitized loans.  If they do not have an end buyer, chances are they wont be back until they do.  It is extremely difficult to forecast or model out "uncertainty".  Investors, small and big, write loans for a fixed monthly cashflow and if that can not be received, it does not serve its purpose.

For a lot of these reasons here, I feel the loan structures being offered going forward will be priced out with LTV's closer to where they were before the big money came into the market.  The ones lending will be your traditional direct lenders that represent private investors or have their own pools of capital to lend of which you pointed out in your reply.

Sorry for the typos.  I went to school for Accounting and Finance hahah.

@Rick Pozos, thank you for sharing your insight.  It is weird how history tends to repeat itself disguised in different forms or "strategies".  

Hope you and your family are staying healthy.

Good Morning Guifre,

Is the 75% LTV based on the purchase price?

@Account Closed, thank you for the feedback and yes, it did escalate pretty quickly over the past few years.  Hope you and your family are staying healthy.

Thanks @Eric Johnson.  Different times indeed and it will be interesting to see who is here when the dust settles.  

Hi Eric,

That is going to be a continued trend from hard money lenders and I would even expect some to start pulling back into the 15% range if they are maxing out leverage based on an ARV. I feel the loan structures available for rehabbers last month are going to change going forward.

Here is CA, there were structures being pushed at 85%LTP/100% Rehab and priced in the 8's%.  I feel that structure will not be returning anytime soon and we are going to start seeing structures revert back to before Institutional Money flooded the Hard Money space.  I posted an article earlier today that has outlined the evolution of the hard money space and where I think it will be heading.  Lenders will probably start writing more of a traditional bridge loan.

Feel free to reach out directly with any questions.

Thank you for the feedback @Joseph Cacciapaglia.  Hope all is well with you and your family.

The goal of this discussion is not to push any negativity among private lending operations that have started over the past few years. In fact, "mine is one of them". What we want to do is identify and explain how quickly the private lending industry evolved and why some companies had a firm stop as of last week.

In the hard money industry, the rates that are offered, coupled with leverage are a direct result of "supply and demand" of capital. The active real estate investors that were acquiring distressed assets in 2010/2011 may remember a time when everything was priced comparable. Common structures in California, dependent on leverage, started at 12% interest and 2-3% origination, sometimes higher. During this time there was an abundance of properties and not a lot of free capital available for loans. The main source of capital for Private Lending firms were Private Investors looking for a secured return against real estate, or Companies that had their own capital to lend out. Many brokers had borrower relationships but no capital. Brokers would refer these clients to Private Lending Firms.

As the market continued to gain traction in 2012 and into 2013, Private Lending Companies heard whispers that "Institutional Money", "Private Equity", and/or "Wall Street" money was making an attempt to enter the marketplace. Who could blame them? At the time, there were really no comparable investments that had as strong of a risk/return profile as a secured, first trust deed against real estate. There was a hurdle they faced, SCALABILITY. Technology and resources did not allow them to deploy the capital they needed.

From 2014 -2016 another shift started to occur as technology began to improve, crowdfunding became more mainstream, and Fintech started to make an appearance. Companies started to form mortgage pools, or funds, to allow for quicker closings and larger spreads. Online crowdfunding platforms started giving a huge group of retail investors access to loans secured against real estate. Family Offices were coming around to get more comfortable with lending. During this window as technology improved, "Institutional Money" started to make its push into the Hard Money Industry.

This newly available capital was great for the borrower. As access to capital improved, pricing, and leverage reached points that were not previously available. The Private Investors from 2011 and 2012 were now being pushed to compete with these new loan structures that arguably were "too rich for their blood" (ie: too risky). Remember from earlier, rates/leverage/and pricing are based on "supply" and "demand" of capital and there was an extreme "flood" of capital into the market, all while quality deals were becoming scarcer. I remember sitting down with investors in 2016, 2017 & 2018 and walking them through what was occurring. That was not the time to chase yield. Rather, stick to our parameters, even if it meant a reduction in volume. Leverage options were being increased while rates were being driven down. In investing, the term typically goes "More Risk, More Return." In this instance, we were seeing "More Risk, Less Return". The risk/return profile that attracted big money into the industry was being squeezed and this profile was no longer making sense.

In sitting down with investors, we discussed when "Big Money" sees an opportunity for arbitrage, they exploit that market until there is no way to gain an advantage on returns.

As quickly as "Institutional Money" enters a market, it can leave a market. Literally overnight.

Heading into 2019 there were great loan structures being offered to Fix and Flip investors. Fix and Flip investors were able to capitalize on the opportunities to borrow more money at lower costs than ever before. Correspondent lending programs exploded which helped resolve the scalability issue mentioned earlier. From a passive investor point of few, these structures did not appear to be sustainable at the pricing being offered. Again, "supply and demand" of capital.

The more money a firm raises over a short period of time, the faster it needs to get it to "work". We witnessed loan structures at 80%-90% LTP and 100% of the rehab. On paper, this netted over 100% of the purchase price. These were being priced anywhere from 1%-2% origination and rates starting in the low 8's%. A Private Lender was actually able to price out a bridge loan with substantially lower leverage, at an equal or slightly higher rate than a Fix and Flip Loan.

What happened?

Covid 19, Stock Market Sell Off, Liquidity dried up, and EXTREME Market Uncertainty.


How quickly can institutional money leave a market? Overnight. That is what happened last week. Hard Money and Private Lending operations that started over the past few years, backed by this Big Money, put a pause on lending. Not all of them, but a good amount. They are in a wait and see position. In other words, this potentially means, "Wait and Re-Allocate."


What does this mean for Active Real Estate Investors going forward?


This is simply my opinion, but in the short term, pricing and leverage options are going to "revert back to the mean". If you want to call it that. The structures will drift to what was being offered before "Big Money" entered the space and the 85%/100% structure may not make a return. There will be a sticker shock on pricing and leverage, as a majority of the Lending Companies still lending will be pricing risk into their loans. Leverage may be reduced; pricing may increase. There will be liquidity in the marketplace and a majority of this liquidity will be in the form of Private Investors and Companies that have done this dance before.